BEHAVIOR AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND PROJECT FUNDING OF RESEARCH by Bredahl, Maury E. et al.
Staff Paper Series
Staff Paper P79-21 June 1979
BEHAVIOR AND PRODUCTIVITY
IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND
PROJECT FUNDING OF RESEARCH
by
Maury E. Bredahl, W. Keith Bryant and
Vernon W. Ruttan
University of Minnesota
Institute of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics
St. Paul, MN 55108
Department of Agricultural and Applied
EconomicsStaff Paper P79-21 June 1979
BEHAVIOR AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPLICATIONS
OF INSTITUTIONAL AND PROJECT
FUNDING OF RESEARCH
by
Maury E. Bredahl, W. Keith Bryant and
Vernon W. Ruttan
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University of MinnesotaBEHAVIOR AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
AND PROJECT FUNDING OF RESEARCH*
Maury E. Bredahl, W. Keith Bryant and
Vernon W. Ruttan**
The last decade has been characterized by a growing lack of con-
fidence in research decision making processes, In the United States
the agricultural research establishment has been viewed as uriresponsive
to environmental, distributional and humanitarian concerns (Berry;
Hadwiger; Mayer and Mayer; Meier). New clientele groups have attempted
to move concerns such as nutrition, rural development, environmental
impact, soil conservation and the problems of hired workers higher on
the research agenda (Paarlberg).
One result has been an effort to design and implement more
responsive allocation mechanisms. Within the U.S. Department of
Agriculture this took the form in the late 1960s of attempting to adapt
the program, planning and budgeting system (PPBS) for research decision
making (Puterbaugh). A number of the state agricultural experiment
stations experimented with attempts to develop more responsive research
resource allocation systems (Fishel; Shumway). The United Kingdom has
attempted to apply the customer-contractor principle to research
sponsored by the Agricultural Research Council (Ulbricht). Brazil has
established an autonomous public corporation to manage its commodity-
oriented national research programs and to support the several state2
research programs (Pastore and Alves). In 1972 the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS) was reorganized to facilitate greater central
direction of research effort within the USDA agricultural research
system. More recently the federal program of institutional support
for research at the state agricultural experiment stations has been
supplemented by a new program of competitive grants in support of
individual projects (table 1).
In this paper we attempt to analyze some of the efficiency impli-
cations of two alternative research funding systems: (a) A system in
which funds are made available to support the research program of a
particular research institution. We refer to this as the institutional
research support (IR) system. The institutional research (IR) support
was the traditional instrument employed to
mission-oriented research in the fields of
resource exploration, industrial standards
support federal and state
defense, agriculture, natural
and related areas prior to
World War II (Dupree). (b) A system in which support is provided
through project grants to individual scientists or research teams, We
will refer to this as the project research grant (PR) system. The
project research grant (PR) mechanism emerged as a major instrument





1940s and early 1950s (Stein).
competitive grant program of the National Science Foundation,
grant requests are received from individual scientists or
teams and evaluated by peer panels, is a prototype of the
project research system. The program of federal support for agricul-










































state agricultural experiment stations on a formula basis, is a proto-
type of the institutional research system.
1 .-. Institutional support is ,.2:
?:
also provided in the major research-oriented universities through
reduced teaching loads (Keyfitz). Many funding agencies employ both
methods in their research support activities. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (US/AID) provides institutional grants in
support of the research programs of the international agricultural
research centers which are part of the Consultative Group on Inter-
national Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system. It also operates a com-
petitive project research grant program. The Ford Foundation has
provided institutional support for the research program of Resources
for the Future since the early 1950s. It has also made institutional
I grants to the Social Science Research Council to enable the Council to
operate the Foreign Area Fellowship Program--a program of project
research grants. The state agricultural experiment stations employ a
project system as an instrument in managing their institutionally
funded research programs.
The traditional argument for an institutional research (IR) system
is that it provides the continuity of program support that is needed for
the long-term commitment of professional resources and facilities to
problems of major scientific, technical or social significance. In
agriculture, for example,
professional resources to
led to the development of
it is argued that the long-term commitment of
particular institutions--such as those that
hybrid corn, rust resistance in wheat, vaccine
to control Marek’s disease in poultry, or improvement in the yield of
rice in the tropics--would be unlikely to occur under a project research
system.5
The argument. that is typically made for support of research through
a project research grant system is that it creates a market-like
environment that attracts the most creative scientific talent to
priority areas of scientific or technological endeavor. Arguments in
favor of the PR system are also frequently linked with arguments in
favor of a peer review system for allocating resources among competing
project proposals.
There has been considerable discussion in recent literature of the
equity considerations involved in project research grant programs
(Bowers; Gustafson; Cole, et al.). The system has been criticized for
inequity among institutions and individuals-- for unduly favoring estab-
lished research scientists and institutions. The general conclusion of
the several evaluation studies is that allegations of bias in the
grant-making system cannot be sustained. The efficiency implications
of the project research grant system have, howeverv received relatively
little attention. Bernard R. Stein has argued that a project grant
mechanism that is not closely linked with mission-oriented institutions
has led to the substitution of scientific progress for the achievement
of tangible technical ends as a measure of public accountability. The
system has also “been criticized in a recent Science editorial for diverting
excessive scientific effort to grant preparation, evaluation and
administration (Leopold).
The sources of funds available to U.S. state agricultural experi-
ment stations have consisted primarily of federal funds appropriated to
the states on a formula basis and of funds appropriated for agricultural
research by state legislative bodies (table 1). Although federal6
“formula” funds are granted to the state on a matching basis, in recent
years most states have supported agricultural research at a level that
substantially exceeds the federal matching requirements. In addition
to federal and state funds, many state agricultural experiment stations
also obtain substantial contract and grant support from private indus-
try, private foundations, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and from
other federal and state sources. The contract and grant support from
other federal agencies and other sources has tended to increase slightly
more rapidly than the traditional sources
The most interesting new development
tural research has been the establishment
funded competitive research grant program
of funds.
in the funding of agricul-
by Congress of a federally
open to all scientists to be
administered by the Cooperative State Research Service (since January 24,
1978, the Cooperative Research Unit of the U.S.D.A. Science and
Education Administration).
2
The FY 1978 appropriation act made a total
of $15 million available for competitive research grants. The executive
budget for FY 1979 proposed that the competitive grants program be
increased by an additional $15 million. This was to be offset by a
reduction of approximately $12 million in Hatch Act formula funding
plus reductions of approximately $2.0 million in special research grants
3




that was finally passed by the Congress restored the cuts in
Act funds that had been recommended by the administration and
the competitive research grant program at the $15.0 million
level. The executive budget for FY 1980 continues Hatch funding at the
FY 1979 level and proposes an increase in the competitive grants Pro-
gram from $15.0 to $30.0 million.(Corrected
The most interesting
Ver8ion - second paragraph, p. 6)
new development in the funding of agricultural
research has been the establishment by Congress of a federally funded
competitive research grant program open to all scientists and administered
by the Competitive Research Grants Office of the USDA Science and Education
Administration.
2
The FY 1978 appropriation act made a total of $15 million
available for competitive research grants. The executive budget for
FY 1979 proposed that the competitive grants program be increased by an
additional $15 million. This was offset by a reduction of approximately
$11 million in Hatch Act formula funding plus reductions of approximately
$1.0 million in McIntire Stennis Cooperative Forestry Research, $2.0 million
in special research grants and $1.5 million in rural development research.
3
The 1979 appropriations act that was finally passed by the Congress restored
the cuts in the Hatch Act funds that had been recommended by the adminis-
tration and continued the competitive research Grant program at the $15,0 mil-
lion level. The executive budget for FY 1980
FY 1979 level and proposes an increase in the
from $15.0 to $30.0 million.
continues Hatch funding at the
competitive grants programTable 2. Amount and Relative Importance of Federal, State
and Other Funding Sources for State Agricultural
Experiment Stations, 1967 and 1977
1967 1977
Amount Percent Amount Percent









































aFunds received by states differ from funds appropriated by the
amount of direct and indirect federal administrative charges.
Source: USDA CRIS printout. (FY 1977 data are preliminary. FY 1978
and FY 1979 are not yet available.) We are indebted to Roland
Robinson of the USDA Science and Education Administration for assist-
ance in obtaining the CRIS data.
4/11/79
Preliminary8
Strong support for a program of competitive project research
grants to be administered by the USDA had been made in two reports
sponsored by the National Research Council (1973, 1977). The National
Research Council recommendations reflected, in part, a judgment that
the productivity of agriculture and agriculturally related research
could be enhanced by making USDA research support available to scien-
tists in departments and institutions that had not been eligible for
support under the formula funding arrangements.
Administrative officers and scientists at the state agricultural
experiment stations had also been generally supportive of the move to
expand funds for competitive grants (Babb). Both the National Research Council
and the leadership of the state experiment stations had, however,
expected that an expansion of funds for competitive research grants
would take place in an environment of expanded support for agricultural
research. They apparently did not anticipate the trade-off between
competitive grant and formula funding that emerged in the FY 1978
4
executive budget proposal.
The argument for expanding support for agricultural research has
typically drawn on two sources of support. Agricultural scientists and
science administrators have pointed to the technical constraints that
must be overcome to meet future food and fiber requirements. They have
also argued that technical change leading to lower production costs
represents one way of balancing the conflicting claims of farmers for
higher incomes and of consumers for restraint in food price increases.
Economists have buttressed these arguments with an expanding body of
empirical research which has documented the high rates of return to9
past agricultural research (Boyce and Evenson; Arndt and RuLtall; Ruttan).
They have also, in recent years, worked closely with research adminis-
trators to provide ex ante rate of return projections.
5
Both the con-
straint and the rate of return approaches suggest substantial under-
investment in agricultural research both in the United States and in
most other countries where such studies have been conducted.
The next section of this paper presents an analysis of the
behavior of individual scientists in an environment characterized by
the availability of centralized project grant systems and decentralized
institutional grant systems. We then examine the behavior of research
administrators under the two research support systems. Finally, we
attempt to draw some inferences from the behavior of research scien-
tists and administrators under the two systems for research system
efficiency. No attempt is made in this paper to present empirical
estimates of the efficiency losses associated with a shift in resources
from institutional to project grant support. The analysis presented
here does, however, provide the framework for empirical evaluation of
the efficiency gains and losses from the two systems of research
support.
The Research Scientist
What objectives does the individual research scientist attempt to
maximize? And how do the project (PR) and institutional (IR) research
grant systems impinge on the behavior of the individual scientist?
The research scientist has been depicted as both hero (Stakman,
Bradfield and Mangelsdorf) and villain (Berry). Our perspective is10
more modest. The typical research scientist is, as a result of
inclination and conditioning, prepared to accept a rather high degree
of deferred gratification within the professional reward system. In
the immediate post-doctoral years the scientist is usually willing to
defer immediate financial reward for an appointment which assures con-
tinued professional development --preferably documented by the accumula-
tion of evidence of research productivity in the form of published
papers. If professional productivity is accompanied by reasonable
advancement in rank and earnings~ the initial research orientation is
reinforced. If productivity lags or is not accompanied by advance–
ment in salary or rank, there is often a shift in emphasis toward
research that is valued by clienteles other than professional colleagues.
This shift toward more applied research may also be associated with a
transfer to another institution whose program is more oriented to
applied research, During this process the mid-career scientist may also
develop certain entrepreneurial skills. These skills may run in the
direction of capacity to generate research support from funding agencies
and/or to mobilize the interest and the energies of colleagues to focus
their efforts around problems of scientific or technical diversification
which require a team effort. Development of entrepreneurial skills
often comes at the expense of disciplinary capacity and direct involve-
ment in research.
This description is, of course, highly simplified. And our ability
to model is inadequate to deal with even this simplified view. However,
we are able to identify several key elements of the individual
scientist’s objective function that appear directly relevant to the11
scientist’s behavior under the institutional and project grant systems.
The simplified behavioral model that we have developed has the follow-
5
i.ngcharacteristics:
(a) Each researcher maximizes some utility function by allocating time
between leisure and work. The time devoted to work is allocated
between teaching, entrepreneurial activities such as seeking research
support and actively working on research.
(b) Research output is determined by the level of research support
available to the researcher and the time spent actively working
on research. The researcher faces diminishing returns both in
the production of research funds and in the production of research.
(c) The transaction costs incurred by the individual researcher in
obtaining project research support are greater than those incurred
in obtaining institutional research support. However, the level of
available IR support may be a binding constraint. That is, IR
funds may be rationed and become unavailable before the researcher
achieves the equilibrium allocation of time which maximizes
utility.
(d) Income is a positive function of research output and some measure
of teaching and/or extension (or public service) output depending
on the way in which a particular scientist’s appointment is
defined.
The researcher derives satisfaction from income (generalized con-
sumption), leisure, and perhaps also from his (her) research, teaching,
and extension output directly. While his (her) utility function is
probably a positive function of all of these variables, we deal.with asimpler (and not markedly less realistic) case in which utility is
a Positive function only of consumption and of leisure.
7 Each
researcher determines his (her) personal trade-off between leisure and
income (generalized consumption) and the optimum allocation of labor to
research, teaching, extension, and funds acquisition aspects of the job.
The optimum levels of each depend on the financial rewards from doing
each, the researcher’s marginal productivities in each endeavor, the
marginal productivity of capital (operating capital and equipment) in
research, the maximum amount of institutional research (IR) funds avail-
able to the researcher, and the relative preference of the researcher
for leisure over consumption (income).8
A useful way in which to view the process is through the researcher’s
individual demand for research funds (K). The demand for K can be




that IR funds (Kh) are limited at each institution and are
among its researchers, and the difference in marginal costs
by the researcher of obtaining IR funds and competitive project
(PR) funds. Figure 1 illustrates the researcher’s demand function for
research funds. Total dollars of research funds demanded by the
researcher are plotted on the horizontal axis. Up to the limit (~max)
of IR funds, (Kh), IR funds are cheaper to acquire than PR funds (Kg).
Consequently, \ is plotted from the origin to K~x and Kg is plotted
from ~mx to the right, indicating that the researcher will demand IR
funds first and will demand PR funds only after IR funds
The marginal cost of research funds to the researcher is



























*Marginal money value of foregone leisure required to
acquire research funds.14
leisure required to acquire an added dollar of research funds; it is
the marginal cost of grantsmanship. The marginal cost of grantsman-
ship increases as the marginal real wage rate earned by the researcher
9
increases, and as the marginal products of labor spent acquiring lR
funds (ht) and PR funds (gt) fall.
The demand for research funds by the individual researcher is
traced by supposing that the marginal products of labor in both grantsman
activities are initially quite low. And, both ht and gt are exogenously
increased through, for example, a reduction in the paperwork involved in
grant application. They are supposed to increase proportionally so as
to maintain the difference between them; ht > gt, of course, on the pre-
sumption that it is much easier to gain access to IR funds (up to the
maximum, K:x) than it is to compete successfully for competitive funds.




increasing demand for Kh as the marginal cost of IR
At point b the increasing demand is halted by the limit
max
%’
imposed on the researcher by the availability and
allocation conventions of the local experiment station. In the ab sec-
tion of the curve, PR funds are too expensive to be demanded (see
equation (18) in the appendix). With a continued increase in both ht
and gt, the marginal costs of research funds continue to fall but the
researcher demands no more research funds because the marginal costs of
PR funds (the value of the foregone leisure required to exercise grants-
manship) are higher than the increased income the first dollar of PR
funds would bring to the researcher (see equation (19) in the appendix),
The researcher is, therefore, caught in the bc portion of the curve.15
With continued exogenous increases i,nthe marginal product of labor
in grantsmanship activities (gt), the marginal cost of acquiring the
first dollar of PR funds falls finally below the marginal benefit to the
researcher (the increased income it would bring), thus initiating the
researcher’s demand for PR funds at point c, Further increases in gt
will increase the demand for PR funds (Kg) by the researcher as points
farther down section cd of the curve illustrate (see equation (20) in
the appendix).
Several implications can be drawn from the analysis. First, at
any institution there will be those scientists with so low a demand for
research funds that they are not constrained by the limit on IR funds.
These will be individuals who are very productive in non-research
activities relative to research and those with very high marginal prod-
ucts of labor in research relative to the marginal product of research
funds. The former will specialize in teaching, extension, and adminis-
trative activities while the latter will be the “pencil and paper”




funds and will not be affected by ~mx. Of course, the more
the institution, the larger will ~mx likely be for any indi-
We would, expect, kherefore, inter-institutional differences in the
proportion of faculty operating in the unconstrained, ab portion of the
curve. Depending on the allocating conventions of experiment stations,
some fields may be allocated relatively more than others and so the
scientists within these fields will likewise be less constrained.
Second, there will likely be a number of individuals at any insti-
tution who operate in the bc portion of the demand for research funds16
curve. Such individuals would demand more IR funds were such funds not
rationed. But, they demand.no competitive funds (Kg) because the
marginal cost of K~ (the marginal value of the foregone leisure) is
greater than the increment to income the added funds would bring. The
number of such researchers who are thus “immobilized” depends, of
course, on the length of the discontinuity, bc. It will be longer (and
thence the frequency of immobilized researchers greater), (i) the
greater the difference in the marginal costs of IR and PR funds, (ii) the
better substitutes research funds and researcher labor are in research,
and (iii) the better substitutes teaching, extension, administration
and research activities are in yielding income to the individual.
Third, within the range of the discontinuity, bc, while the demand
for research funds is invariant, the amou’nt of research done is not.
Being barred from PR funds by their hi~h marginal cost, the researcher
may substitute his own labor for research funds and continue to increase
research output, subject, of course, to greater diminishing returns than
would otherwise exist. The labor intensity of the research, then, will
increase as a result of the limitation on IR funds and the high cost
10 of competitive funds. This labor intensity with respect to the pri-
mary researcher’s labor may also involve changes in the research output
mix: more theoretical work, more use of secondary data, smaller and
fewer experiments, smaller and fewer instances of primary data genera-
tion as the research becomes more labor-intensive.
Fourth, another impact of the discontinuous demand for research funds is
to increase the labor devoted by the scientist to other aspects of his
(her) appointment: teaching, extension, administration. Consult-
ing activities can also be expected to increase. Again, this17
bias toward non-research activities will occur to the extent that the
individual has a positive demand for income (is not in the backward
bending part of his supply curve of labor) and the marginal wage rates
for the non-research aspects of his (her) appointment are positive.
Not only, therefore, does the limit on Illfunds and the high cost of
competitive funds increase the labor intensity of the research enter-
prise of those caught in the discontinuity, it also has the effect of
increasing the labor intensity of all other aspects of the individual.~.s
job.
Fifth, those not caught on the discontinuity and who have high
enough demand for income (consumption), compete for PR funds and operate
on the cd portion of the demand for research funds curve (see equation
(20) in the appendix). The research outputs and incomes of such
individuals are higher than those who operate on the ab and bc portions of
the demand curve for rsearch funds. Since the marginal cost of PR funds
is much higher than the cost of IR funds, the research funded with
IR and PR funds will be more labor-intensive than the research of those
operating on the unconstrained, ab portion of the curve. Whether the
research done on the cd portion of the curve is more or less labor-
intensive than tliosecaught in the discontinuity depends on the differ-
ence in the marginal costs of PR and IR funds: the greater the differ-
ence the more likely the research of those caught in the discontinuity
will be more labor–intensive than those demanding PR funds. One way of
looking at this is that as the difference between the costs of the two
types of funds increases, more of the scientist’s time must be devoted
to grantsmanship and less to direct research activities if he (she) is
to compete for PR funds.18
Sixth, it is very likely that a reduction in IR funds with the
consequent increased stringency with which remaining IR funds would be
rationed among researchers (a shift to the left of ~x in figure 1)
will increase the difference between
funds. As IR funds are increasingly
pushed from the bc to the cd portion
the marginal costs of IR and PR
rationed, more individuals will be
of the demand for funds curve and
will compete for PR funds. The increased number of competitors for PR
funds will drive down the probability of acceptance of any given pro-
posal and so raise the marginal cost of grantsmanship. A transfer of
the reduced IR funds to PR purposes (as the USDA proposed in 1978) will
increase either the number of PR projects funded or the level of funding
per project and so increase the expected yield per proposal. The net
effect of these two changes is unclear. If academics are as risk averse
as recent writings on the economics of academic tenure and retirement
suggest, the decline in the probability may well be more important than
the increase in PR funds. If SO, the marginal cost of PR funds will
rise. A possible result of transferring funds from IR to PR purposes,
therefore, will be to increase the proportion of researchers immobilized
in the bc portion of the curve.
Seventh, it is worth noting that given a distribution of grantsman-
ship skills among scientists, the greater the difference between the
marginal costs of IR and PR funds, the greater the likelihood that
specialization of function will arise among scientists. The more
skilled as grantsmen will specialize in the activity doing little or
11
no actual research. And with the PR funds they will hire scientists
relatively more skilled in research to which they will allocate research19
funds. Of course, what is being described is a process somewhat similar
to which our present experiment station administrators and researchers
differentiated themselves. One effect of the current attempts by the
USDA to shift funds from IR to PR purposes will be to reshuffle the
scientific manpower deck so as to disemploy current experiment station
administrators and employ new grantsmen-administrators presumably more
willing to allocace funds to problems which have been ranked high on
the national priority agenda-- as interpreted by the USDA or by members
of the appropriate House and Senate committees and their aides.
The Research Administrator
An assessment of the efficiency implications of a project research
grant system relative to an institutional research grant system must
consider the effects of the two systems on the behavior of the research
administrator as well as the behavior of the individual scientist. In
this section we suggest how the project and institutional research grant
systems impinge on the behavior of the research administrators. We
shall be particularly concerned with the impact on the behavior of the
director of an agricultural experiment station, research center or
laboratory located within a university environment.
Our description of the objective function of the research adminis-
trator is largely intuitive. Kaldor has repeatedly pointed to the
dearth of systematic knowledge about the decision making processes used
by research administrators (1971, 1978). Most of the knowledge that we
do have is based on casual observation and introspection. Nevertheless
it does seem feasible to specify some of the elements that enter into
the decisions of research administrators and scientists.20
The typical research manager tends to have a view of the world
which places a heavy weight on the value of new knowledge and new tech-
nology and places a low weight on both the direct and indirect costs of
research and of technological change. The administrator visualizes an
almost “endless frontier” waiting to be discovered and with limited
financial, physical and professional resources. The administrator’s
standing, both within his (her) own institution and among outside
collegiate and clientele constituencies, is directly related to the
ability to assemble or develop a research staff that is recognized for
the quality of its work or its value to clientele constituencies.
Within public sector institutions, where the salary structure is bureau-
cratically determined and has little flexibility at the top, prestige
considerations carry greater weight than in the private sector where the
output of the research laboratory is evaluated more directly in terms
of the enhancement of the firm’s profits.
The net effect of these considerations leads a research director to
measure success in terms of the capacity to acquire additional resources
and the ability to utilize these resources productively. The measure-
ment of the quality or the value of research output at the individual
scientist or research team level is highly subjective and the management
of research enterprises is highly collegial. These factors tend to lead
to an emphasis on the quality of the mjor input, professional personnel,
relative to the value of research output. Emphasis on more effective
monitoring of research output is greatest in those cases where there is
strong clientele pressure. Clientele pressure on research management
is reasonably strong in state and federal agricultural research programs21
because of the close feedback loop between farmers, legislators and
research institutions (Guttman).
The above description of the elements that enter into the objective
function of the research administrator or manager is not inconsistent
with the utility funct:ion of the bureau manager that has been suggested
in the literature on bureaucratic behavior (Niskanen; Ruttan). In that
literature it is assumed that the bureau manager’s utility is a func-
tion of: (a) the bureau’s output, (b) the bureau’s discretionary
budget. In the case of the agricultural experiment station or the
agricultural research institute, we can interpret bureau size in terms
of research staff and the output of applied research that is valued by
the research institution’s clientele. Discretionary budget can be
interpreted in terms of funds to support more fundamental (basic or
supporting) research and for related professional activities (seminars,
symposiums) that serve to enhance the capacity of the research staff or
the prestige of the research unit.
If incremental growth in research funding is primarily in the form
of project rather than institutional research support, as suggested in
the introductory section, one effect will. be to reduce the discretionary
resources available to state experiment station directors. A higher
proportion of institutional support funds will have to be devoted to
salary and overhead items. Capacity to mobilize resources for problems
of significance at the state or regional level will be reduced.
This description of the utility function of the research manager
involves an even greater simplification of a complex reality than our
description of the utility function of the individual research scientist.22
It does appear, however, to catch important elements of the typical
research manager’s motivation. We are now ready to combine our analysis
of the effects of the institution research grant (IR) and the project
research grant (PR) systems on the behavior of the individual scientist
and research administrator, on the efficiency or the productivity of
the research system, and
research administrators.
Some Research
on the strategy alternatives available to
Management and Policy Implications
It seems quite clear that a system which combines substantial
internal institutional (IR) and external project (PR) grant funding is
consistent with the objective functions of both individual research
scientists and science administrators.
From the perspective of the individual scientist the internal
institutional support provides assurance of tenure. The external proj-
ect support assures sufficient independence to permit the achievement
of the professional as well as purely economic goals that enter into
the researcher’s objective function. Many young researchers see the
possibility of external PR funding as an opportunity to achieve freedom
from in-house pressures to conform to institutional research strategies
and objectives.
From the perspective of the experiment station or research institute
director the internal institutional support provides assurance of reason-
able program and staffing continuity. The external PR funds appear to
represent an opportunity to escape from the funding constraints of tra-
ditional clientele and an opportunity to devote larger staff resources23
to innovative or fundamental research objectives that are less subject
to review and evaluation by traditional clientele.
Research efficiency
It would be surprising, ‘however, if optimization of the objective
functions of research scientists and administrators would under most
circumstances lead to system efficiency. System efficiency is a function
of the institutional environment, including the structure of Incentives
and opportunities, in which scientists and administrators carry out
their professional responsibilities. When we examine the implications for
the behavior of scientists and research administrations under the IR
and PR systems, some rather clean-cut empirical generalizations concern-
ing system efficiency emerge.
First, the external PR grant system diverts efforts by individual
scientists from research to grant-seeking and related entrepreneurial
activities. Thiq is why the PR portion (section cd) of the individual
12
researcher’s demand for funds lies below the IR portion (section ah).
Most university scientists can quote examples of the colleague who has
spent much more time preparing grant requests for the support of summer
research than was spent actually carrying out the grant–supported
research. More directly to the point, in 1978 t’heUSDA, which adminis-
tered a competitive grant program of $15 million,
research proposals involving funding requests for




been noted for other grant programs (Leopold). In addition to the time
devoted to the preparation of unfunded grant proposals there is also
very substantial time devoted to peer review and administration.Excessive allocation of scientific effort to grant-seeking activity
is clearly induced by a major structural feature of the competitive grant
system. To the individual researcher the supply of PR funds appears
relatively elastic (with respect to effort devoted to grant seeking).
Each individual project is small relative to the resources available to
the granting agency. In the aggregate, however, the supply of research
funds is relatively inelastic in the short run. An increase in the
number of project submissions results in an increase in the share of
research resources devoted to grant seeking relative to research and an
increase in the bureaucratic resources devoted to grant management.
It may also result in smaller average size of individual grants and
fragmentation of research effort.
Second, in a system in which institutional support is limited pri–
marily to personnel support for core scientific staff (such as tenured
professors) and capital equipment (such as laboratory space and computing
equipment), incremental research costs must be covered by project grants.
over time, a research institute committed to solving a particular
scientific and technical problem, adapting soybeans to shorter growing
season environments for example, may find its staff responding more to
priorities of external funding institutions rather than concentrating
its effort on the crop improvement mission. It is not difficult to
imagine a situation where a university administration begins to value
its agricultural (or space science) research capacity less for the sig-
nificance of the scientific and technological knowledge it produces than
for the overhead generated by research grants or contracts.
This problem appears to be most acute in situations in which25
institutional research support has been closely linked to, or hidden
by, reduced teaching loacls. In the 1950s and 1960s many universities
used expansion of undergraduate education to support the expansion,
almost surreptitiously, of their institutional research support
(Keyfitz). This has created two important problems in a period of
declining or shifting undergraduate enrollment. Institu-
tional research support by discipline or problem area expanded in
response to differential rates of growth in undergraduate enrollment.
Likewise during a period of declining or shifting enrollment, institu-
tional support is eroded for considerations unrelated to scientific
opportunity or technological priority. As noted earlier, institutional
support for agricultural research has not
undergraduate enrollment as in many other
substantial pressures in some states from
been as closely coupled to
areas. There are, however,
university administrators
and state legislative committees to conform to university-wide
standards with respect to student-teacher ratios. In the future,
effective allocation of institutional research resources will require
the development of budgeting mechanisms that more effectively uncouple
the institutional support for teaching and research activities.
Research strategies
What are the policy options available at the level of the individual
agricultural experiment station or research institute when con-
fronted with a world in which institutional support is severely limited,
and incremental project research (PR) grant funds are increasingly
available from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Science26
Foundation, and other governmental and foundation sources? Three
alternative strategies are available:
One alternative is a “research entrepreneurship” strategy. This
strategy, as followed by some experiment station directors, is to
utilize most of the institutional support funds from federal formula
funds and state matching funds, primarily to cover scientific staff and
staff-related costs. Staff are then encouraged to “prospect” for
research program support among public and private agencies which make
research grants or which contract research. This is the standard
pattern for research-oriented academic departments or schools which do
not have access to sources of substantial institutional support.




experiment station or research institute. It permits
a larger research staff than a strategy in which institu-
is reserved for research program support. It probably
results in a selection process in which staff with research entrepre-
neurial ability are attracted to research stations which emphasize a
research entrepreneurship strategy. It provides research administrators
wi~h an independent judgment of the quality of staff research effort.
Quality is inferred not only from publication in peer-reviewed journals
but also from the amount and source of project research funds attracted.
There are also costs to both the individual station and the
research system. We have observed that the development of research
entrepreneurship capacity, particularly if developed relatively early
in a scientist’s career, may be competitive with the development of
capacity to advance scientific knowledge. There are also serious27
institutional repercussions for a research entrepreneurship strategy
when the supply of grant or contract funds in areas that are important
to the institution’s central thrust declines. This may be a particularly
serious problem for a state agricultural experiment station where
research effort is expected to pay off in terms of state economic and
social development objectives.
A second alternative .isan “in-house” strategy. In an “in-house”
strategy, research is limited to those research programs and activities
which can be supported by federal formula funds, state matching funds
and special appropriations, endowments and other forms of relatively
unrestricted long-term institutional support. An advantage of the
“in-house” approach is that it enables the research director to assemble
a staff of scientists who are primarily motivated toward the development
and exercise of scientific capacity rather than entrepreneurial capacity.
It permits a focus on relatively long-term and fundamental research prob-
1ems. And it provides a greater opportunity for the scope and direction
of the research program to be set by the experiment station or research
institute rather than by granting agencies.
There are also costs co an “in-house” strategy. In the presence of
a strong director the research decision process may become too authori-
tarian. The security of research funding may result in a research pro-
gram that is too routine--to filling in the gaps in the literature or
to meeting the short-run information needs of clientele groups. In the
presence of a weak director the research resource allocation system may
become too political--too responsive to the pressures of strong depart-
ment chairmen or research scientists who generate strong local clientele28
support. An “in-house” strategy may also impose excessive limits on the
size of the research unit.
A third alternative which may be the most “efficient” strategy in
an “nth best” world would appear to include elements of both the research
entrepreneurship and the “in-house” strategy. These elements would
include:
(a) Recognition that the aggregate supply of research resources is
likely to be more responsive to the efforts of research directors,
or of directors acting as a group, than to the efforts of indi-
vidual researchers. This may imply that the entrepreneurial
(political) activities of experiment station directors and deans
of agriculture may be more productive in their efforts to expand
the availability of research resources than in their role as allo–
caters of “in-house” research resources.
(b) Retention of sufficient control over “in-house” research resources
to provide sufficient seed money for young researchers to enable
the research administration and outside funding agencies to make
accurate judgments of their research and entrepreneurial capacities
and to back the high-risk or speculative research of serious
researchers of p~oven capacity that may later serve to attract
external support.
(c) Allocate the balance of “in-house” funds to salary ancl related
costs of scientific staff on the expectation that most mid-career
and senior staff have reasonable capacity to attract external
funds.29
Research policy
A research policy that
“nth best” strategies is by
forces research managers into adopting
definition less than optimal when viewed
from a broad national or social perspective.
We have noted that the effect of a system which appears optimal
to the individual scientist or to the individual research manager in
a world characterized by limited institutional support and substantial
project research support alternatives is to (a) induce both excessive
allocation of professional resources to grant seeking and (b) contrib-
ute to the disintegration of the capacity to undertake major mission-
oriented applied research programs. These two sources of inefficiency
can be reduced by utilizing an institutional research strategy as the
primary device for the
for the basic research
research program.
In contrast there
support of mission-oriented applied research and
required as a direct input into an applied
is substantial evidence to support the claim of
efficiency for the institutional support system. High rates of return
have been attributed to the state and federal agricultural research
systems in the United States, to a
tions in former colonial countries
Institute of Malaysia), and to the
number of older research institu-
(such as the Rubber Research
older units of the CGIAR-sponsored
international agricultural research system (Evenson; Ruttan). It would
be extremely difficult to imagine that the long–term research effort
required to develop the high-yielding clones which have revolutionized
productivity in the Malaysian rubber industry could have been accom-
plished on the basis of a series of project grants from a colonial
research secretariat in London.30
The inferences drawn from agricultural research are consistent
with the experience of a number of highly productive industrial research
programs. Mansfield has documented rates of return to industrial
research in the same range as the rates of return to public sector agri-
cultural research (Mansfield, p. 157). The more productive private
research programs have typically been those which have combined long-
term sustained support by a firm with a sufficiently broad product line
to be able to utilize a substantial share of the product of a major
“in-house” research program (Mueller).
Finally, one can point to the productivity of a number bf l.ong-
term institutional research support activities by the private founda-
tions. The support by the Carnegie Institution for the fundamental
studies on inheritance in maize by George H. Schull is a classic example
(Sprague). The Rockefeller Foundation support for the research program
of the Office of Special Studies in the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture
over several decades (from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s) established
the basis for the research on wheat and maize that has led to yield
increases in a number of tropical countries (Hayami and Ruttan). The
long-term support for the research program of Resources for the l?uture
has been a major factor in establishing resource economics as a major
field of economic research in the United States.
Some qualifications
There are several qualifications or counter arguments to the con-
clusions set out in the previous sections.
Long-term institutional research support can also become a source
of inefficiency. Institutional research programs are subject to the31
danger of becoming too conventional or to losing a sense of urgency with
respect to their mission. We noted earlier that project grant support
has at times been defended on the basis that it forces a research system
to become more responsive. We find no fault with this argument as long
as project research support remains relatively small--as long as its
impact is to encourage the exploration of new opportunities within the
broad research mission of an institution.
There are also other devices for offsetting geriatric tendencies
in a mature research institute. The development of cost sharing
arrangements between public research institutes and clientele groups,
or user representation on boards of directors Gr advisory committees,
are among the possibilities. An important factor in the case of the
state agricultural experiment stations has been their location within a
university environment. The interaction between graduate training and
research and the opportunities to draw on professional capacity in
related fields have contributed to research productivity.
Another argument which must be dealt with is whether a competitive
PR support system is an effective way of taking advantage of the
research capacities that exist outside of institutionally funded
research programs. A major argument in favor of the new USDA project
grant program is that it would be able to draw on professional resources
in departments that do not receive experiment station funding and in
institutions that were not part of the land grant system. The project
grant programs of the National Science Foundation are available to
individual scientists in institutions which have very little institu-
tional research capacity.32
This argument is only partially compelling. The United States has
been reasonably successful in evolving a dual system of colleges and
universities in which those institutions that are capable of organizing
effective graduate training and research activities are sharply differ-
entiated from those that do not possess such capacity. The major
research universities probably have greater capacity to manage effi-
ciently a program of research grants based primarily on the quality of
individual projects than a central granting agency such as the USDA or
the National Science Foundation.
For the colleges and universities which do not have sub-
stantial graduate programs, faculty research must be justified primarily
on the basis of contribution to the viability of the teaching programs.
A limited commitment of faculty effort to scholarship and research con-
tributes to the vitality of undergraduate teaching programs. Even in




our experience leads us to believe that institutional
program of small grants would be more efficient than a
that is centralized in a Washington agency.33
APPENDIX
A model of the maximization of utility by an individual researcher
is presented. The model allows the researcher choice over the time
spent in research, grantsman activities, and in I.eisure. Teaching,
while an integral part of the activities of most university–based
researchers,
13
is excluded from consideration as a needless complication.
Let the utility function of the researcher be
(1) u = U(C,L)
where C represents consumption and L represents leisure.
The production of research output is dependent on the level of
research funds generated (K) and the time spent c[oing research (Tr).
The research production function can be represented as:
(2) R= r(K, Tr); < 0. ‘k’ ‘t > 0; ‘kk’ ‘tt –
Note that funds gathered from institutional research sources (~) and
from competitive grant sources (Kg) are simply summed into an aggregate
funds variable,
(3) K = Kh+ Kg,
implying that to the researcher the two sources c)ffunds are perfect
substitutes.
The production of research funds is differentiated by the source
of the funds. The respective production functiorls for institutional
and competitive grant funds are:34
(4) \ = h(Th) ; ht > (),htt ~IJ,
(5) Kg= g(Tg); gt > 0, gtt:O.




implying a maximum amount of time that can be spent
in obtaining institutional funds, T~x. Moreover, the marginal pro-
ductivity of time spent seeking institutional funds is presumed to be
greater for all levels of institutional funds than that spent seeking
competitive funds. This reflects the realities of competitive grants-
manship. Typically, competitive proposals must be more detailed than
institutional proposals and many more proposals must be written per
dollar of competitive funds obtained than per dollar of institutional
funds. This assumption is written
(6) gt <h .
TO = t Th = T~x
g
This assumption implies that institutional support will be exhausted
before competitive funds are sought.
Finally, income is assumed to be a function of research output:
(7) I = i{R}; it > 0, irr ~ O.
And, total available time (T) is exhausted:
(8) L+Th+l’g+Tr-T=o
where Th + Tg + Tr represents total work time.
The individual’s choice problem can be represented by the maximiza-
tion of the following Lagrangian:35
(9) U~’= u(C,L) - A1[C - i{r(h(Th) + g(Tg), Tr)}]
- A2[L+Th+Tg+Tr - T] - a3[Th - T~xl
The first order conditions of this function are:
(lo) au’~/ac= Uc - al = o
(11) ~U*/~L = Ill - A2 = O
(12) ~U*/aTh = Alirrkht - A2 - A3 = O
(13) au*/aTg = Alirrkgt - A2 = O
(14) au~~/aTr= Alirrt - ~2 = o
(15) au*/aal = -C + i{R} = O





sought . Thus, A3 =
(18) irrkht = irrt
cases emerge from the first order conditions. The
researcher choosing a level of leisure at which
are not exhausted and competitive funds are not
O and
= u#lc .
The marginal rate of substitution of leisure for goods equals the incre-
ments to income brought about by increments of time spent seeking insti-
tutional funds and in direct research activity. It should also be
noted that this is the condition that would be met in equilibrium if36
institutional funds were unlimited within the range demanded by the
individual researcher.
The second case describes a researcher caught on the discontinuity
embodied in equation (6). Institutional funds are exhausted but no
competitive funds are obtained because their price in terms of the
value of foregone leisure time is too high. The condition for this
situation to occur is:
(19) irrkht - A3/uc = irrt = ul/uc
where A
3
indicates the cost of the individual researcher in terms of
lost marginal utility of the constraint on institutional funds. Were
the marginal product of time spent
of time, the individual’s research
greater. Furthermore, since added
obtaining funds a continuous function
output and resulting income would be
institutional research funds are
unavailable and competitive funds too expensive, some additional time
will be spent in direct research in order to equate i r with rt
irh- A3/uc rather than simply irrkht (A3/uc being positive).
rkt
Since
more time will be spent in direct research activity relative to funds
acquisition activities and thence relative to research capital (K) in
the constrained than in the unconstrained case, research will be more
labor-intensive.
The third case depicts a researcher whose utility function justifies
the large amount of extra foregone leisure required in order to obtain
competitive funds. The condition which must be met is:
(20) irrkht - A3/uc = irrkgt = irrt = ul/uc.37
TIlisresearcl~er seeks competitive flulds,has a higher level of research
output and income than eitl~cr of tileotl~er two individuals. Research
output and income are both lower, however, for this individual than if
institutional funds were unconstrained or competitive funds not so
costly. The added time spent in grantsman activities (over and above
that necessitated to garner institutional funds had they been unlimited)
might be considered a dead-weight loss resulting from the differential
costs of institutional and competitive funds. Relative to the uncon–
strained case, the research this individual does is more labor-intensive.37a
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FOOTNOTES
.
‘Funds allocated to the states under the Hatch ACC are, except for
funds reserved for cooperative regional research efforts, allocated to
the state agricultural experiment stations by a formula based on the
number of farms and the size of the rural population i.neach state.
The several sources of federal funds for state agricultural research
are identified in the latest annual report of the Cooperative State
Research Service (1976). Factors affecting the support for state
agricultural experiment sfi,ations have been analyzed by Huffman and
Miranowski (1978), Peterson (1969), Heady (1961, 1962) and Dalrymple
(1962).
2
A program of special grants that were competitive among state
agricultural experiment stations was initiated in 1970. These funds
rose from $2.8 million in 1970 to $16.2 million in 1979 (table 1).
3
The details of the 1978 executive budget proposals in support of
the Cooperative State Research Service are from the Science and
Education Administration Experiment Station Lettex 1438 (January 27,
1978) . The new grant program was discussed in an editorial by Gary A.
Strobel in the March 3, 1978, issue of -Science. For a more detailed
description of the competitive grants program see the Science and
Education Administration (1978) announcement in the
of March 7, 1978.
4
Dr. M. Rupert Cutler (Assistant Secretary for
Federal Register
Conservation,39
Research, and Education, USDA) appeared to be surprised by the results
of ids own budgctin~ efforts. ‘rn rCJSpOHSC’ LO (:olllmil”l”(?(” qu(!sl l{~i~ll~x 01]
this point he responded, “That apparent relationship was unlritended.
By that I mean the relationship between beginning a competitive grant
research program open to all agricultural scientists and the level of
the Hatch Act budget request.” Dr. Cutler went on to explain that many
of the programs of the USDA (entitlement and regulatory programs) are
legislatively determined. Given a budget ceiling, the remaining funds
available for agricultural research programs are fixed. Thus the only
available method to initiate the competitive grants system was the reduc-
tion of other research areas,
5
For a review of the methodologies for estimating ex ante values ———
of return see Shumway (1977). For an attempt to develop ,exante rate
of return estimates see Araji, Sim and Gardner (1978).
6
Since developing the model outlined below, our attention has been
drawn to similar models developed by William E. Becker, Jr. (1975, 1979).
Becker’s models are, however, designed to address different questions.
7
That the individual derives satisfaction from working does not
affect the results unless the individual derives satisfaction in differ-
ent degrees from the various aspects of his (her) job description and
in particular unless differential satisfaction is drawn from IR and PR
financed research.
8
A mathematical exposition of a model of the individual. researcher
is presented in the appendix. The notation used in the text conforms to
that in the appendix.
9
It is presumed that leisure is a normal good and that the40
researcher does not operate on the backward bending part of his supply
of labor.
10In this instance and hereafter when labor intensity is discussed,
it is researcher or project director labor that i.sbeing referred to.
Within the limits of IR and PR funds, other labor (graduate students,
post-doctoral fellows, research assistants, secretaries and the like)
may be employed to carry out particular facets of the research.
11
There is some evidence to the effect that younger scientists are
more active in journal publication than older scientists and that the
marginal value of a journal article, in terms of income, declines with
the scientist’s age (Peterson, 1973, p. 14).
12See also both references to Foster (1979),,
13The introduction of teaching into the model allows another con-
clusion to be drawn: that the constraint on institutional research
funds will bias the work effort of all but the “leisure-loving”
researcher (see equation (18) below) away from research and into teach-
ing in comparison with a situation in which institutional funds were not
constrained. In a time when the demand for teaching resources is
reduced, this seems counterproductive. The other conclusions of the
model presented below remain unaltered.41
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